In Price v. Smith & Wesson, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether a negligence claim against a firearm manufacturer could proceed following a mass shooting using a stolen handgun.[1]
The Plaintiffs alleged that the firearm manufacturer, Smith and Wesson negligently failed to incorporate authorized user technology into the handgun used in the 2018 Danforth shooting. Such technology would have prevented the firearm from being fired by an unauthorized user and thereby prevented the deaths and injuries that occurred. The Defendant responded by bringing a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action.[2]
The motion judge struck certain aspects of the claim as untenable. However, they declined to strike the negligence claim. Both parties appealed.[3]The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, including that of the Defendants, allowing only the negligence claim to proceed.
Issues
The following issues were considered by the Court of Appeal
- Does a gun manufacturer owe a legal duty to members of the public who are injured by the criminal misuse of its product, even if those people did not buy or use the gun?
- Is the connection between the manufacturer and the injured parties close enough, given the way the gun was designed, made, and sold, to justify imposing legal responsibility?
- Was it reasonably foreseeable that failing to include available safety features to prevent unauthorized use could lead to serious injury or death?
- Is the claim based on a simple failure to act, or does it arise from the manufacturer’s active decision to design and distribute a handgun without available safety safeguards?
Analysis
The Court did not accept that the negligence claim could be resolved by the application of existing consumer product liability categories. It rejected this argument on the basis that most product liability cases involve harm to the user or purchaser of the product, and do not generally consider harm or injuries on the part of “innocent bystanders.
While the Court declined to treat the claim as a straightforward extension of consumer-focused product liability law, it did note that Canadian negligence law has not limited the manufacturer’s duty of care exclusively to end users. In particular, it pointed to the recognized exception involving motor vehicles, where manufacturers may owe duties to other road users if motor vehicle defects cause injury, confirming that manufacturer liability to third parties exists in some circumstances.
The Court then considered whether the harm was a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the Defendants conduct, or lack thereof. It determined it was. In doing so, the Court considered broader trends, including increased widespread firearm theft, frequent violent misuse of stolen handguns, and the Defendants awareness of those risks. They relied on regulatory data and the Defendant’s own conduct, including, most notably, its acknowledgment of the dangers associated with unauthorized firearm use and its prior commitment to implement technology designed to prevent such use in the United States.
The Court distinguished the case from Rankin (Rankin’s Garage) v. J.J., where the foreseeable risk of vehicle theft did not automatically entail a foreseeable risk of bodily harm. Unlike vehicles, the Court explained, firearms are designed to cause serious injury or death, and when stolen, the risk of violent misuse is inherent.[4] In simpler terms, the probability of a stolen firearm causing harm is much greater than that of a stolen vehicle.
A central issue in this case was whether foreseeability alone could establish proximity. The Court reaffirmed that where physical harm is a foreseeable consequence of a defendant’s conduct, the relationship will frequently be sufficiently close and direct to ground a duty of care.
The Court rejected the argument that the Defendant’s conduct was an omission rather than an overt act, falling out of the exception identified in Childs v. Desormeaux.[5] Treating such conduct as a mere omission, the Court held, would distort negligence law, particularly in product liability, as many claims involve the failure of a manufacturer to implement adequate safety systems.
The Court compared the claim to basic negligence principles. It explained that when a company makes a product without reasonable safety measures, whether that means failing to prevent a snail from getting into a bottle of ginger beer or failing to include available safeguards on a firearm, the manufacturer may have a duty to take steps to reduce the risk of harm. [6] That duty can extend not only to users of the product, but also to people who may reasonably be affected by its use.
The Court held that the involvement of a criminal did not automatically break the legal connection between the parties. If the very risk being complained of is criminal misuse, then the fact that a crime occurred does not end the analysis. A defendant cannot avoid a potential duty of care by pointing to criminal conduct if that conduct was a predictable result of the alleged failure to address known risks.
The Court also rejected broader policy arguments, finding that recognizing that a duty of care exists in this case would not lead to unlimited or unmanageable liability. There is a definable group of people who could be harmed by unauthorized firearm use, similar to the defined group of road users to whom drivers owe duties. Finally, the Court confirmed that the existence of detailed firearms regulation does not automatically eliminate a negligence claim unless legislation clearly states that it does.
Implications
The Court’s reasoning has practical significance for municipalities and their insurers, particularly in cases involving third-party wrongdoing and allegations of failure to implement safety measures. The decision confirms that foreseeable physical harm remains central to duty of care analysis and that the presence of an intervening actor will not, in itself, defeat duty or proximity where that conduct is the predictable manifestation of a known risk.
Further, the decision underscores that exposure assessments should not assume early dismissal of negligence claims simply because harm is mediated through third-party conduct or because regulatory standards were met.
[1] Price v. Smith & Wesson Corporation, 2025 ONCA 452.
[2] Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 21.01(1)(b).
[3] Price v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2021 ONSC 1114.
[4] Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v. J.J., 2018 SCC 19.
[5] Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18.
[6] Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 CanLII 536.















